Now, I make no claims to be trained in formal philosophy or anything
like that - I'm a computer programmer by trade, and a layman when it comes to
deep philosophical debate. Formal logic calculus gives me a headache. However,
even a layman such as myself can see the gaping flaws in the many arguments
put forward for the existence of a God.
Some theists appears to base a considerable amount of their argumentation on
this, stating that they have logically proved the existence of God (or, that
theism is rational) so why is anyone still even discussing it?
Let's have a look at one such example of a Modal Ontological Argument (MOA). This article was originally written to debunk ("refutation" gives the argument too much credit, as we shall see) a "proof" of the existence of God at a website created by a theist who goes by the handle of "Metacrock" (who used the argument extensively to support his position on message boards), but I have modified it to be a general-purpose critique of similar arguments, rather than just appearing to be an attack on a particular individual's theology. I am sure there are far better critiques of these sorts of arguments - this is just my personal one. The purpose of this article is not to show that God does not exist, but that this relatively sophisticated type of argument is not convincing as proof that He does.
The example, from http://www.geocities.com/metagetics/3.htm
Modal argument for the existence of God: argument from necessary being.
1) God is by definition not contingent.
2) Since God is not contingent, God must be either necessary or impossible.
3) God is logically possible (i.e. conceivable without contradiction). God is derived from analytic terms of logical and ontological necessity.
4) Being logically possible God is therefore not impossible.
5) Therefore, since God is possible and not-contingent it follows that God is not impossible, and therefore, necessary.
Skipping ahead a little, you will notice that I use a considerable amount of text to debunk these mere five lines of argument. However, so much is built onto this "nut" that it becomes necessary to use a sledgehammer to crack it and ensure it stays cracked. =)
The theist does not initially define "God", as used in premise 1, in any meaningful way. We are told nothing about the nature of "God" (apart from it being described elsewhere as the "ground of being" - see Flaw #5). We see from 1 and 2 together that he considers there to be only three possible definitions for God: necessary, contingent or impossible.
Guess which he chooses to suit his argument? God is therefore necessary because that was chosen that for the definition of God (being "perfect", God cannot be dependent on anything else, and theists do not define God as "impossible"). He has not shown that God is not contingent, nor has he shown that God is not impossible (either of which would be unacceptable to a theist) - we shall address these later. He appears to merely assert this to support his own argument, although premise 3 is based partly on Anselm's argument which is weak to the point of being invalid anyway (see section 2, below).
God is by definition necessary because the theist defines him as such. Hmmm..
( Actually, this is not an entirely fair criticism. The theist is attempting to determine the modal state of God. If God is impossible, the argument cannot proceed. If God is contigent on something else, then there must still be a supreme being of sorts, which would itself be necessary. This effectively limits you to the choice of God being impossible or necessary. Still, most non-believers, and some theists also, would reasonably object to the whole idea of this argument as it appears to be trying to talk God into existence. )
By defining God as being anything at all is to beg the question : how do you know this about something which has not been shown to exist? To then go on to use this definition to prove the existence of God turns it into a circular argument (not entirely circular, as we shall see - it takes several detours through even more rocky terrain before arriving back at the beginning).
You may as well say "By definition, God exists. Therefore God exists." The argument above appears to be doing exactly this, but in a rather long-winded and distracting manner.
How could God, the alleged creator of this universe, be contingent (dependent on something else)? There could, of course, be some sort of meta-god, which creates Gods of the sort that create universes. Some current theories of quantum physics, for instance, suggest that there could well be a "multiverse", an infinite number of universes. If this is so, then maybe each has it's own Creator.
This is likely to be dismissed due to infinite regression, i.e. there is still only one ultimate Creator. But (in this example), we are dealing with a Christian who relies on this "proof" of the single creator of our universe to support his claims for the validity of the existence of a single God (which is central to Christianity). As far as Christianity is concerned, there is one God and it explicitly created this universe. Subcontractor Gods of a multiverse (or even a single universe) are no good for a Christian, as the deity would be neither the supreme being nor perfect. Of course, the same problem applies to non-Christian monotheists, as well as polytheists - the same basic argument could be used for a pantheon of Gods, and the proponents would then have to arbitrarily reject a monotheistic deity.
The Creator of this universe could therefore be dependent on a super-Creator, and actually be marginally less powerful than that one. This is a rather weak argument, however, but does demonstrate the assumptions made by the theist in his own favour.
Likewise, there is the "committee of Gods" idea, wherein an arbitrary number of Gods (two, a dozen, a billion) exist. To an atheist, polytheism is just as implausible as monotheism, but a monotheist (e.g. a Christian) certainly cannot accept it, whether it is possible (using the usual vague definitions) or not. If one God can exist uncaused, what reason is there to think that a hundred cannot? The same "modal argument" may be used to demonstrate the existence of a million Gods, or a God for each particle in the universe (replace "God is" with "Gods are") . Absurd it may sound, but then one God must sound equally absurd for the same reasons.
The MOA is, however, intended merely to demonstrate the existence of a generic supernatural cause to the universe, rather than any specific deity or deities, so it could be argued that this particular criticism (Christianity's reliance on monotheism) does not apply. Still, as it stands, the MOA can only specifically support a sort of Deism. To take it any further and equate the Creator with the God of a particular religion (e.g. Christianity) then raises questions about the coherence of that religion's definition of God (does it have conflicting attributes? and so on). Linking the two together like this can backfire, resulting in possibly refuting one or both of them - if a Creator exists, but cannot be shown to equate with the God of Christianity, Christianity collapses; on the other hand, if the God of Christianity is refuted, then either they both fail (as the MOA/Christian Creator will fall into the "impossible" category) or you are left back at the Deist square one. An "agnostic theist" position may be the safest if you use this argument, as you can then say "I believe there is a God, but it may be impossible to know anything about it."
Flaw #1 is probably the weakest of these criticisms, but we do not need to rely on it alone to refute the theist's argument.
The logical possibility of God.
Without a strict, clear and unambiguous definition of "God",
we cannot say that God is logically possible or not. Defining God as a necessary
creator is not enough. A common definition of the Christian God is that he is
omnipotent (all powerful, i.e. unrestricted in his ability, unrestrained by
space or time), omniscient (all knowing, i.e. has absolute knowledge of everything
in the universe, throughout all space and time), omnibenevolent (infinitely
good, kind, merciful and loving), omnipresent (exists at all points throughout
space and time). Many definitions of a God that include several "omnis"
fail because they are self-contradictory and therefore logically impossible.
The argument from evil discounts the possibility of a God being both omnipotent
and omnibenevolent; the argument from free will discounts the possibility
of a God being omnipotent and omniscient. These are well known problems
and they will need to be addressed before the theist can use an omni-something
God, let alone define such a god as logically possible, conceivable without
contradiction, and necessary.
In order to accept the claim, made in point 3, that "God is logically possible (i.e. conceivable without contradiction)" we will need to have a clear and unambiguous definition of God. However, theists invariably invoke "mystery" and "unknowability" at this point. The modal argument would appear to crash and burn at point 3.
If God is described with any qualities at all (kind, loving, good, all-powerful and so on), then they must all be true for a God with that definition to exist. Put logically, A and B and C and D and E and F and G .... and X and Y and Z must all be true. If any of a, b, c, d or e are false, the whole equation is false. If only takes a single tiny contradiction to refute the existence of any given God - either the description is faulty, or the God just ain't there! (See "Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey" by T.M.Drange)
There is also the problem of infinite regression when considering an eternal God's decision-making (i.e. the decision to cause the universe), expanded upon in my "Causation" article.
One theistic comeback to this question of logic is that God created logic and is therefore not constrained by it, which implies that it is entirely possible for God to be logically impossible, both exist and not exist, decorate his house with square circles and have a pet goldfish that is an elephant. If this is the case, then the concept of "God" becomes meaningless as it is impossible to ever know anything for certain about him (back to theistic agnosticism again).
Leaving aside the question of whether or not a God exists, how are we to ascertain that this God is omni-anything at all? Is the creation of a universe a sure indication of absolute omnipotence, for example? Very powerful, certainly, but totally unrestricted in ability? Who can say? Omniscience itself would also appear to be problematic, if not self-contradictory. If a God truly knows everything, then that includes all knowledge about himself, and all his future actions and thoughts (in whatever way "future" applies to a being outside of time). Can God ever be surprised? Can God even have free will, if all his actions are predetermined by his own knowledge? Theists tend to explain these away by resorting to "faith" or "mystery", which is all very well if you want to avoid cognitive dissonance but is no help at all in any sort of rational discussion.
Can an omniscient being reason, think or learn? How could it? Could such a God be said to be intelligent or aware, or even alive at all in any sense we understand? Omniscience reduces God to a clockwork toy at best, and an impossibility at worst.
For many definitions of God, it is entirely possible (indeed, necessary due to the self-contradictory or incoherent definition) to state that it cannot and therefore does not exist.
First define "God" in clear and unambiguous terms, and then if it is logically possible you can proceed to use it in your argument. Otherwise, you are merely defining God to suit your own arguments in favour of God.
The assumption is also made that science will never be able to satisfactorily explain the origin of the universe (i.e. the Big Bang) in naturalistic terms. Everything apart from God (or so we are informed) must have a cause, therefore the Big Bang must have been caused and the only thing that could have caused it is the uncaused God. From nothing, nothing can come - the old warcry of creationism. Quantum physics, however, presents us with the interesting example of virtual particles, which do come from nothing. If virtual particles are possible, and not contingent (they just "happen" for no reason), then they must be necessary, just like God - if any form of matter/energy can pop into existence uncaused, what need is there for a Creator God as an explanation?
Unexplained does not equate with inexplicable, and much as I know theists hate the phrase, "God of the gaps" appears to fit the bill nicely here. We are currently unable to explain it, so it is safe to assume that we never will and therefore God is the only explanation. The creationist will always have a get-out, of course, as science does not prove things, but provides theories that are adequate to explain the available evidence. It will always be possible to say that science has not decisively proved something, no matter how strong the evidence and theory, so we can invoke the supernatural as an alternative if the science conflicts with our beliefs. Claiming that a particular thing is beyond the scope of current and future science and a supernatural force must therefore be responsible is entirely irrational.
People believed that God was necessary to explain the specific existence of human beings, until the science of evolution demonstrated that to no longer be a necessary or useful explanation. The argument that God is necessary for the existence of the universe depends entirely upon science never being able to provide an adequate explanation for the Big Bang. For if God is no longer necessary then, by the modal arguments reasoning at least, it must fall into the "impossible" category - which no theists could allow themselves to accept. God must exist, otherwise I know I must be wrong, and I know I am not wrong, therefore God must exist.
One attempt to plug this hole is with the assertion that "God is the necessary ground of being", or "existence must exist". Things exist, therefore something must "cause" existence, and the only thing which can do that is a God which is "existence" itself. Apart from sounding tautological and circular anyway, if "being has to be" why stretch that further to include an intelligent, omnipotent, personal entity? If existence must exist by default, I fail to see where a God comes in at all. You may as well say "the universe exists because it must exist", which is still rather lame but at least does not include supernatural, personal deities. Again, the theist is defining God to suit his own arguments, and then conveniently discovering that his arguments prove God. This is akin to preachers who say "God is love, we feel love, therefore we must be feeling God", and just as useless as an explanation of anything.
The theist is attempting to argue like this :
1) X has attribute A
2) Y has attribute A
3) Therefore, Y= X
4) Therefore, Y's other attributes B, C and D are also true.
In other words, "Existence must exist eternally; I claim that God must
exist eternally; therefore God equates with existence and so exists". We
are then encouraged to turn to our Bibles to find out the details about God,
now that the big issue of existence has been dealt with. This is a little like
claiming that because horses exist, unicorns and the pegasus must also exist
as they have many of the attributes of horses.
This also attempts to skirt around the problems described in Flaw 2, regarding the definition of God. To assert that God simply "is" (due to equating with existence), is to imply that he passes all the various tests for logical possibility (i.e. his definition is not self-contradictory) by default. Using this, the theist is then free to say that criticisms regarding omniscience etc. simply do not apply, as the nature of God (however they choose to redefine it afterwards) is already coherent whether or not we mere mortals can understand it. They can say "I believe God to be omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent etc. I have logically proved He exists, so he must be all those things." The various "omnis" can be merrily piled on top of God afterwards, coherent or not. Now, I'm unsure as to the correct philosophical terminology for this, but "weasel words" springs to mind...
One way of looking at this is to say that the universe as we know it exists, therefore there must exist a potential for such existence "outside" the space-time universe. This potential is called an "always existent" - it always must exist, in and of itself. The theist will then go on to say that this potential is infinite, transcendent ("outside" the universe) and can be called "God" because God is defined as infinite and transcendent. However, perhaps the universe includes this potential for existence as well - the universe may consist of the always-existent potential, and anything which exists because of that, i.e. space-time (which we normally think of as the entire universe). Discounting space-time, the remainder of the universe consists of the always-existent potential. Space-time, should it come into existence, is merely one part of the universe as a whole. This would also mean that the universe is always-existent, but space-time need not be.
Let's say that it is possible to logically prove that there is an always-existent potential for existence. However, to then go on and label this as "God" and claim you have thus proved that God exists is neither rational nor reasonable. The potential for the existence of space-time may be transcendent to our space-time, but does that mean it is supernatural? It may simply be one aspect of the universe - the "universe" being everything that is, including this potential. Indeed, such a proof of existence may even support naturalistic theories (such as the "Many Worlds" hypothesis suggested by quantum mechanics - if existence is always possible, having an infinite number of universes may not be a problem at all). Calling part of the universe "God" and ascribing to it intelligence, power, will, emotions and so on does not make it magically become these things. A logical proof of the always-existent potential for existence minimally says "stuff exists because it can". Bolting an arbitrary deity onto it as well seems entirely unnecessary.
However, perhaps from a theistic point of view this reification is a quite necessary step, otherwise they have little left...
( Another problem is that if something caused our universe, what reason is there to assume that the cause still exists? Having done it's job, it may have ceased to exist entirely. This ontological argument can at best suggest that something may be (somehow) responsible for the creation of our universe. It does not (and cannot) show that the cause continued to exist after the event. To say that this whatever-it-was is "God" (aware, intelligent, caring etc.) and is still around watching over us is an unjustified assumption, a non sequiter. )
This also smells a little of the Anthropic Principle - we exist and are able to observe that ourselves and the universe exist, therefore the universe, and by implication the supposed Creator of it, must be necessary - it is impossible for them not to exist. If the universe did not exist, clearly there would be nobody around to witness the fact. The universe does exist, but it does not follow that it must exist, and therefore it does not follow that there must be a God whether or not there is a universe. If, however, the universe must necessarily exist, it still does not follow that any sort of Intelligent Designer must have existed in order to cause it. Either way, it is a rather large leap from "the universe exists" to "God exists".
One response to accusations of God Of The Gaps is that "there is no gap" (due to God equating with and causing existence), attempting to paper over the cracks rather than fill them in. This would make sense if God was shown to exist, as "God did it" would then be an acceptable explanation for anything (even though it does not actually explain much), but this is not the case. The attempted proof of the existence of God, or the rationality of accepting theism, has major problems as we have seen, and it would be premature at best to accept it is as being correct.
If it is accepted that the MOA does in fact demonstrate the existence of some sort of necessary being, it does not then follow that this being actually created our universe. Theories of quantum physics suggest that the universe may still be purely natural in origin, and not need any sort of "outside" influence to exist. If this is the case, then the universe would exist regardless of the existence of any sort of God. God may have just been sitting there (somewhere) and suddenly noticed the universe appear of its own accord. To demonstrate the existence of a God does not show that the universe must have been created by that God, if naturalistic theories are adequate to explain it. A necessary God would then merely be necessary for his own existence, and be entirely irrelevant to the universe or anything in it. As far as we would be concerned, he may as well not exist anyway, and how could anyone tell the difference between a non-existent God and a God which neither caused nor influences the universe?
This would also be a major hole in the idea that the universe can only exist due to the necessity of a God, in which case ontological arguments which rely on such a condition collapse (See "Why Steven Hawking's Cosmology Precludes a Creator" and "Big Bang Cosmology and Atheism - Why the Big Bang is No Help to Theists" for explanations of why (evidentially supported) cosmology is incompatible with the notion of a Creator).
So, we may find ourselves in the situation where the universe has been shown to require no First Cause for existence, and yet the existence of a Creator has also been (apparently) demonstrated through an argument such as the MOA. In which case, it is reasonable to say "Yeah? So what?" to a theist who talks about a supreme being. Until science has managed to unravel the Big Bang singularity, which may not even be possible for us to do, invoking a God (existent or not) to explain the universe is still our good old friend, the God Of The Gaps fallacy. If Hawking's cosmology is correct (and the evidence so far matches his predictions), then a Creator is unnecessary and maybe even impossible (thus refuting the MOA). The most sensible and honest position to take is "We don't know - but we're trying to find out". If, however, science shows that the universe exists uncaused, then there is no need to postulate a Creator and theistic arguments become meaningless, other than to comfort those who still need to believe.
* * * *
It is clear that, far from being a sound demonstration of the existence of God or the rationality of theism, ending the debate once and for all, there are many reasons to doubt the validity of this line of reasoning. Further arguments that rely on "I have already logically demonstrated that God exists and/or theism is rational" are therefore just so much worthless wordplay.
One of the major premises to the previous argument runs a little like this [1] :
1) If God exists, he must be perfect in every way - the greatest thing that
can be, superior to all else.
2) A thing which does exist is clearly superior to a thing which does
not exist.
3) Therefore, if it is possible that God exists, then God must
exist : a non-existent God is inferior to an existent God.
4) It is possible that God exists, therefore God does exist.
This section of the article shows some of the flaws in this particular ontological argument, which in turn kicks the crutches away from other arguments which rely on it (e.g. the modal argument in section 1 - if such an argument does not rely on this, it is still interesting to show the problems with this one anyway).
|
This is partly based on Anselm's argument : from The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
This is saying [1] : 1) We can imagine God (the greatest thing). |
This is used to support the idea that perfection cannot exist contingently - i.e. if it exists, it must be necessary. So, if God is perfect (there can be nothing greater than him) as claimed, then he must exist, independent of any sort of cause. This, in turn, is used to get around the "Who created the Creator?" problem - they are basically saying, "The creator is perfect, therefore he cannot have a cause - otherwise he would not be perfect".
However, there are many objections to the basic premise - that God, if he exists, must be perfect - as well as objections to the formation of the logical argument itself. (See the article mentioned above).
For myself, I find that the concept of a perfect, flawless, omni-everything being to be incoherent (see Flaws 1 and 2 above, also my Causation article), so the basic premise is invalid, and the rest of the argument falls down around it. The definition of "perfection" as attributed to God is bogus, for one thing (apart from defining God to suit the argument). As I've mentioned previously, omnipotence/omniscience/omnibenevolence and so on can be shown to be mutually exclusive, and so cannot all be qualities of a single being, therefore God cannot and does not exist if you claim he has those qualities.
Also, it implies that this God must be "perfectly good and perfectly moral" (as many theists claim), but then shouldn't God also be "perfectly corrupt and perfectly evil"? Clearly another contradiction - the theist can only get around it by Special Pleading, claiming an arbitrary set of things that God is "perfect" in regard to, in order to suit the argument. The theist considers God to be perfectly good, etc., and cannot accept a God that is perfectly stupid (for instance), and just picks the categories that fit with his particular beliefs. Is this justifiable or is it just wishful thinking?
(Interestingly enough, if God could be shown to be perfectly good, kind, merciful and moral, large sections of the Old Testament would have to be deleted, as he is often portrayed as anything but kind, merciful, etc. I wonder what a "perfectionist" Bible would read like...)
Another example : take a giraffe, an Oak tree and God. Which is the greater giraffe? ("What?!?", I hear you cry - bear with me.) In terms of "giraffeness", the giraffe is certainly superior to the other two. Neither the tree nor God cannot exhibit giraffe-like qualities, because they are not giraffes. Alternatively, which of the three is better at creating energy by photosynthesis? Giraffes don't do that, and God does not need to absorb sunlight to stay alive. If we define "perfection" as being "like an ideal giraffe", clearly we are just redefining words to suit ourselves. Why should god-like perfection be considered any less contrived than giraffe-like perfection? "Perfection" is merely a description we apply to things. To say God must be perfect is meaningless unless we can clearly describe both God and what it is that makes him "perfect".
This also begs the question - why must God be perfect? Certainly, most theists define God as being perfect, but is this not just because it offends their sensibilities to consider an imperfect God? I have spoken to some theists who are quite happy to have an imperfect, flawed God, but they appear to be in the minority. The rest seem to say "God must be perfect, because that is how we define God." This makes premise 1 above ("If God exists, he must be perfect in every way") a tautology :- if a perfect thing exists, it must be perfect.
In premise 1 of the MOA, we read "God is by definition not contingent". This can be derived from the concept that God is perfect, and perfection cannot be contingent (dependent on, or caused by something else; or just accidental) - if God depends on something else, superior or otherwise, for his existence then he cannot be considered perfect or necessary. It would be possible to build a perfect integer calculator - we could design and build a calculator that perfectly added numbers. A correct result each time, quickly, exactly, efficiently, consistently. In terms of functionality as a calculator, it could be considered "perfect", even though it was clearly created by imperfect human engineers. Philosophers may object to this use of the word, but to non-professional-philosophers like myself, it seems entirely reasonable. In this context then, perfection can indeed depend on something else. To restrict "perfection" to being a quality that only God can exhibit, and then using this to demonstrate the existence of God seems to be entirely circular reasoning.
Back to Anselm again. Why is existence considered superior to non-existence? Again, this is simply assigning our own arbitrary values to different concepts. Was an existent Adolph Hitler superior to a non-existent one? From the point of view of himself and his followers, certainly. For his victims and enemies, certainly not (I'm not trying to compare God with Hitler, by the way). For Anselm, a God which exists in reality is superior to a God which exists in the imagination - but that's just his personal opinion on the matter. Why should it be accepted as the only possible view? How is it possible to judge the relative greatness of a thing which does (or only might) exist to a thing which does not exist? All you can sensibly state is that one exists, and the other does not - it seems unjustifiable to claim that existence is somehow (and always) superior to nonexistence.
Anselm's argument would additionally appear to restrict God to the limits of human imagination. This implies that God can never be greater than any human can conceive of (and humans are certainly limited in their conceptive ability - things such as the distance between galaxies are inconceivable to us - even though we can measure and write down the numbers on paper, we still cannot grasp the vastness of it). It could be that God would actually be greater than any human could ever conceive of. Alternatively, it implies incredible arrogance on the part of humans, in that we are able to hold in our minds an accurate conception of the infinite, transcendent Creator.
Any argument which relies on this sort of reasoning is clearly faulty, no matter how sound the actual logic used to reach a conclusion is. If the inputs to the logical equation are invalid, the output is worthless. In computing terms, this is described as "Garbage in, garbage out".
A final criticism of arguments like this is - why, if God is supposedly plainly obvious and self-evident, do we have to jump through all these logical and philosophical hoops to find him? They appear to be a last line of defense after all else has failed. I recognise that complex and formal logical methods are extremely useful for nailing down the precise terms of an argument and removing ambiguity, but occasionally these seem to unnecessarily complicate what should be a quite simple matter. For example, during an online debate a theist knowledgeable in these techniques can simply throw several pages of complex logic calculus at his unwary opponent, using it as a tool of obfuscation and intimidation, rather than present his case in plain language.
Ontological arguments such as the above can be quite compelling, but only if you accept the basic premises that they are based on. A believer will have no trouble doing this (as they support what he already believes), and will reasonably consider the arguments to be strong evidence in favour of their beliefs. A non-believer, however, will not find them to be very convincing arguments for either the existence of a God of any sort or the basic rationality of theistic belief, as the success of the argument depends on you believing in God in the first place. This makes the whole thing a circular argument - "I know that God exists; therefore the modal ontological argument is valid; therefore it proves that God exists".
Creating a logical proof of something (such as the existence of God) is one thing, but verifying that it is actually true is another. No matter how solid the logic is and how good the premises appear to be, the proof remains just words on paper until it is verified - otherwise there may be some subtle flaw or faulty premise that has been overlooked. When dealing with things which may be impossible for us to rationally verify (such as God, or abstract always-existent transcendental concepts) it may be wisest to simply suspend judgment and adopt an agnostic position : We don't know now, and we may never know. This would be better than saying "My logical proof says it must be so, therefore it is so."
© Adrian Barnett, 2000, 2001, last updated 22nd March 2001
Notes:
[1] This is a very simply put, but hopefully not oversimplified, version based on Anselm's ontological argument. I'm trying to present it in plain English, and trying not to create a strawman to attack, but I don't want to get dragged into a debate based on formal logic pedantry. I've tried to be fair to the type of argument based on Anselm, although I realise that there are probably endless subtle variations on the theme.
Concise introduction to the Modal Ontological Argument for the Existence of God - Trent Dougherty. This was kindly provided for me by a logician from the www.philosophers.co.uk website, in response to my query about the validity of the argument. Mr. Dougherty finds it to be a convincing argument. This article involves technical formal logic.
Modified version of the modal ontological argument - by Christopher McHugh, intended to solve some of the objections to Hartshorne's argument.
What is the Ontological Argument? A discussion of the argument and some of the problems with it, from atheism.about.com.
Why Steven Hawking's Cosmology Precludes a Creator by Quentin Smith - if Hawkings wave function theory of the universe is correct, then a creator is not only unnecessary, but actually impossible.
Big Bang Cosmology and Atheism - Why the Big Bang is No Help to Theists by Quentin Smith - Is it even reasonable to say that the universe required a "cause"?
There's a good page of articles about various types of ontological arguments,
and the problems with them, at Internet Infidels :
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theism/ontological.html
This article describes them in fairly plain language, and includes some common
objections to them (i.e. begging the question, etc.)
http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/stanford/entries/ontological-arguments/
Much ado about Nothing? - Why does anything exist anyway?
Does Big Bang Cosmology Prove the Universe Had a Beginning? - Mark I. Vuletic. Until it is fully understood, it may be best simply to suspend judgment.
"Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey" by T.M.Drange. Drange discusses the impossibility of a God described with several "omni-" qualities.
